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THE RELEVANCE OF FORESIGHT FOR ACCESSION COUNTRIES AND POSSIBILITIES 
FOR CO-OPERATION 
ISSUE: 
Accession countries, faced with the same challenge of joining the EU while still characterised 
by their own distinct level of socio-economic development, set of institutions, culture and 
norms, can benefit significantly from conducting foresight programmes. Yet, foresight should 
not be conducted for its own sake – just because it is becoming “fashionable” throughout the 
world, and currently being promoted by the EU. On the contrary, there should be a strong link 
between foresight, decision preparation and policy-making. 
RELEVANCE: 
Foresight has now reached a point, at which different approaches can be compared to 
highlight ‘good practices’: what has worked in certain circumstances (level of development, 
challenges and hence policy aims), and thus what set of tools and approaches are likely to be 
useful in different environments. International co-operation, therefore, can be extremely 
useful for accession countries in various ways. The simplest one would be to share 
information, exchange experience, as well as compare methods and achievements, i.e. to learn 
from each other. A more ambitious way could be to conduct joint foresight programmes on 
issues that go beyond the national boundaries, such as accession countries’ role and prospects 
as members in the new, enlarged EU, scope for their re-invigorated co-operation in those new 
settings, etc. However, trans-border foresight exercises would also require adequately adapted 
or even entirely new methods and techniques. 
ANALYSIS: 
ACCESSION CHALLENGES AND FORESIGHT 
Fundamental technological, organisational and structural changes exert an ever increasing 
pressure on all countries to adopt, that is, develop and implement adequate strategies to 
enhance international competitiveness, and thus being able to improve quality of life of their 
population. Accession countries (ACs) face all these tasks, but some of those are even more 
demanding for them than for advanced countries: they need to put more emphasis on 
changing attitudes and norms in general, developing new skills for decision-makers and 
workers, facilitating co-operation between policy-makers, businesses and researchers, as well 
as among firms (large and small, foreign and domestic), and balancing their budgets. 
Moreover, most ACs also have to cope with the challenges of transition from central planning 
to market economy: loss of former markets (hence the need to find new ones); weak 
international competitiveness; relatively poor quality of life and brain drain. These all point to 
the need to devise an appropriate development strategy, together with a sound innovation 
policy as one of its cornerstones, and strengthen their innovation systems. 
 
Foresight – as a systematic, participatory process, collecting future intelligence and building 
medium-to-long-term visions, aimed at influencing present-day decisions and mobilising joint 
actions – can be a useful tool in meeting these challenges. (EC, 2002) It helps in making 
choices – and shaping our future – in an ever more complex situation by discussing 
alternative options, bringing together different communities with their complementary 
knowledge and experience. In doing so, and discussing various visions with stakeholders, it 
also leads to a more transparent decision-making process. Foresight processes can reduce 
certain types of uncertainty, too: participants would learn about each other’s broad strategic 
goals, moreover, can align their endeavours once they arrive at a shared vision. Many 
governments have already realised the importance of foresight activities, and thus this 
relatively new technology policy tool is spreading across continents. (Fleissner, 1998, 
Gavigan and Cahill, 1997, OECD, 1996, Technological Forecasting and Social Change [Vol. 
60]) 
 
Foresight can also contribute to tackle yet another challenge of ACs: most of them are 
struggling with ‘burning’ short-term issues – such as pressures on various public services, e.g. 
health care, education, pensions and thus severe budget deficit; imbalances in current 
accounts and foreign trade; unemployment; etc. – while faced with a compelling need for 
fundamental organisational and institutional changes. In other words, short- and long-term 
issues compete for various resources: capabilities (intellectual resources for problem-solving); 
attention of politicians and policy-makers who decide on the allocation of financial funds; and 
attention of opinion-leaders who can set the agenda (and thus influence discussions and 
decisions on the allocation of funds). These intellectual and financial resources are always 
limited, thus choices have to be made. A thorough, well-designed foresight process can help 
identify priorities, also in terms of striking a balance between short- and long-term issues. 
 
Foresight, however, is not a panacea; it cannot solve all the above problems, and cannot even 
solve any of them just on its own. 
 
 
LEVEL AND SCOPE OF FORESIGHT 
The ‘maturity’ of foresight reached a point, at which it can be classified. (Barré, 2001, 2002, 
Johnston, 2002, Renn, 2002) In other words, no ‘optimal’ approach or any form of ‘best 
practice’ can be identified, yet, taxonomies can be developed to highlight ‘good practices’: 
what has worked in certain circumstances (level of development, challenges and hence policy 
aims), and thus what set of tools and approaches are likely to be useful in different 
environments.  
 
Foresight programmes can be either holistic, or just concentrate on particular technologies or 
business sectors. Holistic programmes, in turn, may have rather dissimilar foci, ranging from 
the identification of priorities in a narrowly defined S&T context to addressing broad socio-
economic needs. They can have different geographical scopes, too, i.e. they can be conducted 
at international (group of countries, collaborating regions transcending national borders), 
national, regional, local, sectoral or firm level. 
 
Foresight programmes can be product or process-oriented, depending on the policy needs to 
serve, e.g. informing specific decisions with analytical reports, list of priorities, recommended 
actions vs. facilitating networking, communication and co-operation among key players. 
These programmes can be supported by a number of analytical and participatory methods 
ranging from desktop research, expert discussions and brainstorming, SWOT- and trend 
analyses, scenario-building, Delphi-survey, to various forms of stakeholder involvement 
(workshops, consensus conferences). Some of them are exploratory in their nature (starting 
with the present situation and then identifying potential future states), while others are 
normative ones (describing desirable futures and asking what paths could lead there). In 
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certain contexts, for certain purposes quantitative methods are more relevant, whereas in other 
cases qualitative ones can or should be used.(Cuhls et al., 2002, FOREN, 2001) 
 
Needless to say that the broad aims, scope, orientation, geographical level, participants and 
methods are closely interrelated. Although one can come up with a large number of 
combinations on paper, only several of them are feasible in practice: they cannot be ‘mixed’ 
freely. In other words, relevant policy needs should be addressed by applying appropriate 
tools, and involving relevant players. Given the wide choice of aims and techniques, it is of 
utmost importance to develop a clear programme concept at the outset, and then design a 
consistent, thorough project plan. 
 
So far two ACs, Hungary and then the Czech Republic, have concluded holistic foresight 
programmes at a national level, following different approaches. Hungary took a broader 
approach, focussing on socio-economic issues, and hence methods were similar to the ones 
applied in the UK. (Havas, 2003, www.tep.hu) The Czech programme, on the contrary, aimed 
at identifying S&T priorities, and thus applied a modified version of the so-called key (or 
critical) technologies method. (www.foresight.cz) This difference has confirmed that context 
does matter: even countries with a more or less similar history, facing similar challenges on 
the whole and being broadly at a similar level of development can opt for different foresight 
approaches/ methods. Other ACs might consider taking somewhat different routes, given their 
own specific circumstances and goals. It all depends on the policy challenges, as well as on 
the policy environment: if decision-makers strongly favour a certain approach, it is definitely 
not a good idea to try to push through a drastically different programme design – even if it 
might seem to be relevant from an abstract theoretical/ methodological point of view. 
 
 
THE DESIGN AND USE OF VARIOUS FORESIGHT METHODS IN ACCESSION COUNTRIES 
The proposals below are formulated in the conceptual framework of the so-called innovation 
system approach. This understanding of the innovation process emphasises the importance of 
communication, mutual learning and co-operation among various actors (e.g. scientists and 
engineers, business people and policy-makers), strengthening the existing – and building new 
– institutions, formal and informal networks conducive to innovation. It is systemic as well, in 
the sense that a successful innovation process encompasses not only technological elements 
(inputs, actors and factors) but economic, organisational and social ones as well. (Lundvall 
and Borrás, 1999; OECD, 1998) 
 
Given the specific accession challenges, it seems to be more appropriate to start with a 
holistic foresight programme at a national level. Then, relying on the various results achieved 
this way – including not only the information collected and analysed, reports published, but 
also the skills and experiences accumulated, as well as the so-called process results – sectoral 
and/or regional foresight programmes can be launched with a higher probability of success. 
Some countries, however, might find it more appropriate to launch sectoral or regional 
programmes as pilot projects to ‘test’ the willingness of potential participants, collect 
experiences about various techniques, etc., that is, to use these pilot projects as ‘on-the-job’ 
training and preparation for their future national foresight programme. 
In any case, the organisation and the management of any foresight programme is crucial: 
• The design of the programme should take into account the level of the socio-
economic development; the size of the country in question; the socio-psychological 
legacy of central planning; the overall communication, co-operation and decision-
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making culture (norms, patterns, written and tacit rules); the legal, organisational 
and institutional framework, etc. 
• Objectives should be formulated clearly at the very beginning. To juxtapose two 
extremes, a foresight programme can be: 
¾ confined to assist the decision-making process of setting narrowly defined R&D 
(as mentioned above, that was the case in the Czech Republic, accordingly the 
‘key technologies’ method was used); or 
¾ geared towards broader socio-economic needs and problems of a country in 
question, i.e. what is the role of S&T developments, various policies and 
regulation in solving these broader problems, what are the responsibilities of the 
various actors: government, scientists and researchers, businesses, NGOs, 
families, individuals? (that was the approach taken in Hungary) 
 
Given the challenges of enlargement in general, and the very nature of the systemic changes 
in the case of transition countries, it seems appropriate to stress the importance of ‘visions’ 
(‘futures’, or fully fledged scenarios) for ACs both at panel (i.e. micro or mezzo) and macro 
levels. Visions (scenarios), however, have been mainly used at micro level so far (e.g. in the 
case of the UK, Portugal, Sweden and Spain), with the exception of Hungary and South 
Africa. Yet, it is not an elementary, evident task to combine micro and macro visions. (Havas, 
2003) Obviously, there is a need for methodological innovations in this respect. 
 
If the panel method is to be applied, the decision on the issues for panel discussions/ reports is 
also crucial in terms of the expected output. One possibility is to set up panels to analyse 
various disciplines and/or economic sectors (e.g. the first UK foresight programme). A 
different approach would be to analyse broader socio-economic issues, like human resources, 
health, environment, business processes, of course with a strong emphasis on technological 
drivers/ opportunities, too, in that context (see e.g. the Swedish and the second UK foresight 
programmes). Again, taking into account the various accession challenges, the latter approach 
is clearly more appropriate for ACs. 
 
The process of accession also calls for explicit policy recommendations (as opposed to, e.g. 
the German and Japanese foresight exercises). Again, the decisions on the objective, methods 
and scope (if it has a technological or a broader socio-economic focus) of the programme 
would influence the issues for policy proposals (e.g. narrowly defined S&T policy vs. human 
resources, various fields of regulation, competition, innovation, FDI and regional 
development policies, institution- and network-building). 
 
Besides panel discussions/ reports, a Delphi-survey can also be useful in ACs. Its benefits are 
threefold: (i) it collects information (experts’ opinion), but (ii) also disseminates those pieces 
of information, and by doing so, contributes to consensus building or identifies dissenting 
views, and (iii) usually it involves more participants in the process (as opposed to the case 
when only panels are included). However, it should be carefully designed, and certain aspects 
need to be considered thoroughly. Just to give a few examples: 
• Is there a sufficient number of technical/ technological experts to conduct a large-
scale postal survey, or is it better to use it as a supporting tool at experts’ meetings? 
• What structure is more appropriate: the traditional one aimed at collecting opinion 
or the more decision-oriented Austrian version? 
• What is the appropriate balance between the strictly technological and non-
technological issues in the Delphi-statements? 
 4
• What are the appropriate questions, i.e. the column headings (taken into account the 
nature of statements/ issues and the country characteristics)? 
• What is the appropriate size of the questionnaire (the number of statements and 
questions)? 
 
For a successful, effective foresight programme strong emphasis should be put on organising 
awareness raising seminars in the first stage, and then on continuous, wide-ranging 
dissemination, discussions in parallel with the analytical activities. It is needless to say that 
without a carefully designed dissemination and implementation most of the efforts and 
resources committed to the programme (time of experts, tax-payers’ money to cover the 
organisational and publication costs) would be wasted. 
 
In sum, it is not only the ‘products’ – i.e. the different documents, final reports, policy 
recommendations – that are important results of a foresight programme, but also the ‘process’ 
itself, namely disseminating a new, participatory, transparent, future-oriented decision-
making method; intensified networking, co-operation and institution-building activities. In 
other words, a foresight programme can contribute to the strengthening of the national system 
of innovation in two ways: through reports, recommendations as well as via facilitating the 
communication and co-operation among various professional communities. 
 
 
CO-OPERATION AMONG ACCESSION COUNTRIES 
There is an obvious scope for co-operation among ACs. Most of them are relatively small, 
and have not accumulated much experience with foresight, while facing a number of similar 
structural challenges. Thus, it can be extremely useful to exchange experiences on methods 
applied in various countries, as well as identifying success and failure factors. Moreover, 
some analytical activities on issues going beyond national borders might also be harmonised 
if there is a mutual interest in doing so. In other words, it cannot, and should not, be imposed 
by any national or international player. However, various international organisations, notably 
the EU and UNIDO, as well as national governments and professional associations might play 
a crucial role in facilitating this co-operation. 
 
The EU, especially, as a sponsor of two foresight projects in accession countries,1 can 
contribute significantly to achieve synergies and economies of scale in a number of ways. A 
well-designed co-operation among the players would assist local (national) capacity building 
and regional (trans-border) networking by 
• promoting interactive learning through joint, tailored workshops (i.e. not a one-way 
flow of codified knowledge at traditional training seminars) to develop skills and 
generate shared tacit knowledge. The most important issues are the benefits and 
drawbacks of various foresight techniques (methods) in the context of accession. 
• facilitating future co-operation among major players (once accession is completed) 
by establishing good, mutually beneficial working relations, i.e. building trust 
through actual co-operation during the national/ regional foresight programmes. 
 
This type of regional co-operation can also help in exploiting economies of scale 
(compensating for insufficient intellectual resources in highly specialised fields, be they 
technical, socio-economic or policy expertise). Some possibilities to kick-off this co-operation 
are: 
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• producing (commissioning) joint background studies on major technological and 
socio-economic drivers (relevant for the co-operating accession countries). More in-
depth, context- specific analyses, of course, should be conducted and policy 
conclusions should be drawn as part of the national foresight programmes. 
• devising scenarios on European/ global developments (if scenarios are to be used in 
the various national programmes); 
• building partially aligned scenarios (the structure of scenarios might be partially co-
ordinated, in other words some ‘variables’ might be the same, while their actual 
‘value’ would differ country by country). 
 
Once co-operation starts, other issues to be discussed jointly and further possibilities for 
building capabilities and sharing resources, exploiting economies of scale are likely to be 
identified by the participants themselves. In other words, any rigid ‘blueprint’ for this co-
operation might be counter-productive: insisting on a detailed plan (methods and milestones) 
might cause more harm than good. 
 
International co-operation, however, poses a significant challenge, too: the broader the 
geographic scope of a programme is, the more difficult and costly is to maintain its 
participatory character. Moreover, when participants are coming from different countries – in 
terms of level of development, norms, ways of thinking, values, behavioural routines – it is 
not only a question of travel time and costs to organise and facilitate meaningful workshops. 
In that cases potential communication problems should be taken into account carefully when 
preparing these meetings: possible gaps should be identified in advance, and efforts have to 
be made to bridge them as well as to remove other obstacles to fruitful discussions. Of course, 
not all the problems can be envisaged, i.e. some ‘slack’ (e.g. extra time for clarification, 
reconciliation, other means to exchange ideas) should be allowed for that. 
 
Another important direction to advance methodology – mainly via experimentation, i.e. 
including ‘action research’ – is to develop and test various methods e.g. for virtual meetings; 
electronic discussions; arranging and exploiting feedback from a series structured, ‘aligned’ 
meetings held separately across various countries on the same set of problems (allowing for 
somewhat different approaches, and yet following the same broad lines of discussions); on-
line questionnaires with (almost) real-time (‘instant’) feedback; etc. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
To conclude, foresight can be a useful tool for ACs to devise adequate strategies for the 
coming years when they continue to be faced with the multiple, complex challenges of 
building a significantly enlarged, new EU, while fundamental changes occur in the global 
structures, too. However, the success of any foresight programme depends on the match 
between its context (level of development, and hence the policy challenges of a given 
country), scope, goals, methods and participation. In short, it has to be carefully designed. 
Further, it is crucial to prove the relevance of foresight for decision-making: its timing and 
relevance to major issues faced by societies, as well as the level of its ‘products’ – reports and 
policy recommendations – are critical. Only substantive, yet carefully formulated proposals 
can grab the attention of opinion leaders and decision-makers, and then, in turn, the results are 
likely to be implemented. Otherwise all the time and efforts of participants put into a 
programme would be wasted, together with the public money spent to cover organisational 
and publication cost. The so-called process results – e.g. intensified networking, 
communication and co-operation among the participants – still might be significant even in 
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this sad case, but they are less visible, and much more difficult to measure. Thus, the chances 
of a repeated programme – when it would be due again given the changes in the 
circumstances – are becoming really thin. 
 
International co-operation can enhance the chances of success by sharing lessons, easing the 
lack of financial and intellectual resources through exploiting synergies and economies of 
scale. Yet, its more ambitious form, i.e. a joint foresight exercise on trans-border issues also 
necessitates methodological innovations. International organisations can also facilitate 
foresight programmes in ACs, and more specifically collaboration among these countries. It is 
crucial, however, to maintain the commitment of local actors, e.g. in terms of time and funds 
devoted to the programme, willingness to implement of the results. In other words, the main 
forms of foreign assistance should be the provision of knowledge-sharing platforms and other 
fora to exchange experience (among ACs as well as with advanced countries), monitoring and 
evaluating ACs’ foresight initiatives. 
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